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Abstract
The labor market impacts of womens age at marriage have recently received signicant
attention from social scientists. The focus of this literature, however, has been the devel-
oped world and almost nothing is known about how a delay in marriage a¤ects labor market
prospects of women in developing countries. This paper addresses this gap in the existing lit-
erature by providing the rst comprehensive assessment of the relationship between womens
age at marriage and own as well as spousal labor market outcomes specically in context
of a developing country. Using nationally representative household data from India, we nd
evidence of positive e¤ects of womens age at marriage on their own and their spouseslabor
market outcomes. To examine whether these e¤ects are causal or arise due to selection into
marriage, we use an instrumental variables-based empirical strategy that utilizes variation
in age at menarche to obtain exogenous variation in womens age at marriage. Our results
indicate that the positive e¤ects of age at marriage of women on own as well spousal labor
market outcomes are not causal and arise purely due to selection. The results are robust to
addressing biases due to nonrandom selection of individuals into labor force. Our ndings
shed new light on theories of labor market in developing countries specically through the
lens of marriage.
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1 Introduction
The labor market impacts of womens age at marriage have recently received considerable
attention from economists and demographers. The focus of this literature, however, has
almost entirely been the developed world, and more specically the United States (see for
e.g. Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2004; Dahl 2010; Wang and Wang 2017). The present
study contributes to this literature by providing the rst comprehensive assessment of the
relationship between womens age at marriage and own and spousal labor market outcomes
specically in context of a developing country. In particular, we examine whether womens
age at marriage a¤ects their own as well as their spouseslabor market outcomes in India,
and if there exists a relationship, whether that arises due to selection into marriage or has
a causal component.
While over the last few years, a small body of literature has emerged that looks at the
impact of womens age at marriage on various socioeconomic outcomes including womens
schooling and their childrens health and education using data from developing countries like
Bangladesh, India and Uganda (see for e.g. Field and Ambrus 2008; Sekhri and Debnath
2014; Sunder 2016; Chari et al. 2017), none of the studies in this literature focus on the labor
market impacts of a delay in womens marriage. Our ndings, thus, we believe, are likely
to shed new light on theories of labor market in emerging economies specically through
the lens of marriage. Additionally, our ndings are likely to be useful for understanding
the e¢ cacy of existing policies that aim at delaying womens age at marriage in developing
countries, as well as for developing more e¤ective ones, given that early marriage of women
is an issue of deep concern in these countries.1
1The mean marital age of women in India was 19.3 years according to the 2011 Census data. Moreover,
an article in the The Wire (June 1, 2016) states that in India as many as 102 million girls (30% of the female
population) were married before 18 in 2011 even though the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act states that a
girl in India cannot marry before she turns 18. In Bangladesh 46.1% of women between the ages of 15 and
19 were married between 2003 and 2005. Corresponding gures for some other poor countries for the same
period were: 42% in Chad, 32.9% in Malawi, 50.4% in Mali, 38.2% in Mozambique and 31.7% in Nigeria
(data from Demographic and Health surveys). For the developed countries, the average age of marriage for
women is much higher. For instance, the mean age of marriage of women in the US was 26.9 years in 2011
(Pew Research Foundation, 2011), for Germany it was 30.9 years, and for Sweden 33.3 years.
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Several theories are put forth to hypothesize the possible relationship between marital age
and labor market outcomes of women. First, early marriage might interrupt the accumulation
of formal education and labor market skills for women leading to lower productivity and
earnings in the labor market. Marriage comes with family responsibilities that often impede
the pursuit of formal education for women. For example, Field and Ambrus (2008) nd
that an additional year of marriage delay leads to an increase in schooling by 0.22 years for
women in Bangladesh. As such, marriage delay would be benecial in the labor market for
women by allowing them to accumulate more formal education and labor market skills. This
is referred to as the formal education hypothesis.
Second, fertility is a signicant part of a traditional marriage. To the extent that fertil-
ity a¤ects a womens labor market outcomes and marriage precedes child-bearing, delayed
marriage could lead to delayed fertility and hence better labor market outcomes for women
(Wang and Wang 2017). In fact, Lundberg and Rose (2002) note that, fertility can a¤ect
a womens wages through two channels. On the one hand, there is the specialization e¤ect
due to the increased value of a womans time relative to that of her spouses, which in turn
would lead women to focus on home production. On the other hand, fertility could increase
value of both parentstime at home on child care, which could again have a negative e¤ect
on womens labor market earnings.2
Third, according to Loughran and Zissimpoulos (2004), quality job matches between
employers and job-seekers are generally achieved only after several job changes which often
involve migration. Gladden (1999) shows that women tend to sacrice their career for their
spouses (more than men do when making migration decisions), and nds that womens
earnings decrease following a move. This theory, thus, suggests that marriage might hamper
mobility for working women, and hence it is likely that marital delay will be benecial for
women.
Finally, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) propose a theory based on asymmetric informa-
2As Wang and Wang note (2017), this is consistent with the motherhood penalty commonly found in the
literature.
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tion. According to this theory, information on the earnings capabilities of individuals is
available only at later stages of the life cycle. Consequently, parents of girls with high earn-
ings potential or those parents who are more focused about their daughters career might be
more likely to be interested in delaying marriages (perhaps due to potential interruption of
accumulation of both labor market skills and formal education from early marriages) until
their daughters earnings potential is fully revealed. This line of reasoning suggests that
marital delay is positively associated with earnings for women. Note, however, the positive
relationship that is predicted by this theory is due to self-selection instead of a causal e¤ect.
In addition to having impacts on own labor market outcomes, womens age at marriage
can potentially also have spillover e¤ects on their spouseslabor market outcome. For in-
stance, if a marriage delay leads a woman to accumulate more formal education or better
labor market skills, this might have a positive impact on her husbands labor market out-
comes as well. As argued by Benham (1974), this could be because a wifes education is
likely to be a substitute for her husbands own formal education as she o¤ers advice and
information, and help her husband acquire specic skills (e.g. coping with change). Ad-
ditionally, an educated wife, by investing in her husbandshuman capital through better
physical and mental health (i.e., an educated wife can e¢ ciently monitor her spouses health
and reduce his participation in risky activities), and by contributing to peripheral tasks
such as entertaining (Jepsen 2005) could also positively impact the labor market outcomes of
their husbands. Put more succinctly, a wifes education may be an input to her husbands
productivity, either directly or by allowing him to specialize in market work(Lefgren and
MacIntyre 2006, p. 802-803), which according to Choi et al. (2008), is likely to take the
form of an increase work hours and higher earnings for married men.
However, of course, as for the women themselves, the positive e¤ect of womens age at
marriage on their husbands labor market outcomes may not necessarily be causal; instead
it may arise due to selection. This may be because men of higher ability may want to marry
more educated women (Welch 1974; Liu and Zhang 1999; Lefgren and McIntyre 2006; Huang
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et al. 2009), and hence might prefer marrying older women since they are likely to be more
educated.
As noted previously, empirical studies that examine the link between marriage timing and
labor market outcomes of women, and specically attempt to understand whether the rela-
tionship is causal or arises due to self selection pertains only to the United States. Loughran
and Zissimopoulos (2004) using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth
1979 (NLSY79) nd that delaying marriage causes hourly wages of women to increase by
nearly four percent for each year they delay in the US. They employ panel data methods
that exploit longitudinal variation in wages and marriage timing. They argue that their
results are consistent with the mobility hypothesis. Dahl (2010) employs an instrumental
variables based approach to address the endogeneity of the timing of rst marriage and ex-
amines the impact of early marriage on poverty for US women. He nds a positive impact
of early marriage on poverty which suggests a positive relationship between late marriage
and earnings for women. Finally, in a recent study Wang and Wang (2017), using 1980 US
Census data and employing an identication strategy that is similar to that used by Dahl
(2010), nd a positive causal impact of marriage delay on wages for women. Further, they
provide strong evidence that the positive causal e¤ects are almost exclusively through in-
creased education.3 Whether the relationship between marriage timing of women and their
labor market outcomes holds specically in a developing country (which is likely to di¤er in
signicant ways from a developed country in terms of population characteristics like income,
education, marital age, family structure, etc.), and whether this relationship is causal, are
questions which have remained unexplored to date. The potential spousal spillover e¤ect of
womens age at marriage has also not been looked at in the extant literature.
We use data from the Indian Human Development Survey of 2012 (Desai et al. 2015),
and focus on labor market outcomes of women and their spouses including hourly earnings,
annual wage earnings, and work days per year. The main empirical challenge in identifying
3Wang and Wang (2017) also carry out their analysis for men. They nd that mens age at marriage also
has a strong positive causal e¤ect on their wages.
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the causal e¤ect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes is that marriage age may be
endogenous. To address this issue, we employ the empirical strategy proposed by Field and
Ambrus (2008), who instrument womens age at marriage by their age at menarche. As
noted by Sekhri and Debnath (2017), variation in the age at menarche generates a quasi-
random di¤erence in the age at which a girl enters the marriage market. This instrument is
motivated by the observation that has been made by sociologists and anthropologists that
parents become extremely anxious to get their daughters married once they have reached
menarche, partly to avert any unwanted pregnancies (Caldwell et al. 1983; Srinivas 1984).
Our results are interesting. The ordinary least squares (OLS) results for the full sample
indicate that a year of delayed marriage of women is associated with signicant benecial
e¤ects for their own labor market performance as well as spouseslabor market performance.
However, when we use the instrumental variable (IV) approach we nd that the age at
marriage of women does not have a signicant impact on their own as well as their spousal
labor market outcomes. Further, we nd that the magnitude of the IV estimates are smaller
than the OLS estimates. Thus, our results support the positive selection hypothesis and
indicate that there does not exist a causal relationship between marriage delay of women
and their own as well as their spouseslabor market outcomes in India. This suggests that
the labor market premium due to womens marital delay that has been documented in the
previous literature is likely to be only a developed country phenomenon and unlikely to be
relevant for developing countries.
Since the IV estimates capture only the e¤ect for a subgroup of individuals who are likely
impacted by the IV (i.e., the compliers), the comparison of full-sample OLS and IV estimates
may not necessarily be a fair evaluation of the selection hypothesis. To address this concern,
we reestimate our model for the potential set of compliers. Our instrument will not a¤ect
the women who were married before puberty. As such, we assume that the set of compliers
consists of women who were married only after attaining menarche. When we restrict our
analysis only to the potential compliers, the OLS coe¢ cients are again larger than the IV
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coe¢ cients indicating positive selection into marriage.
Our results might appear to be somewhat puzzling since it has been documented in the
previous literature that a delay in womens marriage leads them to complete more schooling
in developing countries (see for e.g. Field and Ambrus 2008; Sunder 2016). In fact, for
our analytical sample as well, we nd a positive link between marriage delay and womens
schooling. As such, at least due to the formal schooling hypothesis, one would have expected
to nd a causal e¤ect of a womens age at marriage on labor market outcomes. Despite a
delay in marriage leading to more schooling for women, why does not it get translated into
better labor market outcomes?
We argue that one potential explanation for this is as follows. It has been noted by
Kingdon (1998), Kingdon and Unni (2001), and Kanjilal-Bhaduri and Pastore (2017) among
many others that in India, labor market returns to education is low and insignicant for
women with relatively low education. This could be due to: (1) low quality of primary
education in India (Pratham, 2011), and/or (2) for labor market success, a threshold level of
education might be necessary (for instance, completing college or vocational degree); below
that, an extra year of schooling might not lead to better labor market outcomes. As it
turns out, the majority of women in our sample have completed at most primary education.
Thus, although women in our sample might complete more formal schooling due to a delay
in marriage by a year, this might not be su¢ ciently productive to get translated into better
labor market outcomes since most women in our sample would still belong to the lower end
of the education distribution.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the dataset used. Section
3 presents the econometric model and empirical strategy. Results are presented in the section
4. The last section concludes.
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2 Data
The data come from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2012. IHDS 2012 is
a nationally representative multitopic household survey conducted by the National Council
for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in New Delhi and University of Maryland (Desai
et al. 2015). The survey was conducted between November 2011 and October 2012, covers
42,152 households located throughout India. The survey covered all the states and union
territories of India except Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep. These two account for
less than 0.05 percent of Indias population. The data is publicly available from the Data
Sharing for Demographic Research program of the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR).4 The sample was drawn using stratied random sampling.
The IHDS sampled ever-married women above the ages of 15 (one was randomly chosen
from each surveyed household), who were then administered a separate health and education
questionnaire that included questions on marriage and reproductive history, as well as ques-
tions on health investments. For the analysis of the e¤ect of age at marriage on labor market
outcomes of women, we restrict ourself to the women who participate in the labor force, have
non-missing information on labor market earnings and labor supply, whose marital age is
not less than 5 years and menarcheal age between 9 and 21 years,5 have valid information
on age, height, caste, family attributes like parental education and number of siblings, and
place of residence (rural/urban), leaving us with 10,511 women. We will refer to this sample
as the womens sample.
For the analysis of the e¤ect of marital age of women on spousal labor market outcomes,
we however need not restrict ourselves to working women. In this case, our sample consists
4http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/DSDR/studies/36151
5The normal menarcheal age is between 10 and 15 years. However, menarcheal age as low as 9 years
is not unusual (see for e.g. https://timesondia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/Girl-talk-Menarche-now-at-8-9-
years/articleshow/34169175.cms). Similarly, menarcheal age above 15 years, and in fact, as high as 20-21
years is also not biologically impossible. Delayed puberty may be constitutional or due to pathologic causes
(Blondell et al. 1999). Uundernourishment during childhood is, in fact, one major reason for delayed
menarche. Also, intense physical activity during childhood may delay menarcheal age. In this context,
based on a survey of dancers and atletes, Frisch et al. (1980) and Frisch et al. (1981) note that dancers and
athletes who began their training at ages 9 or 10 years still had not menarche at ages 1820 years.
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of all those women whose spouses are working and spouses have valid labor market earnings
and labor supply information, and spousal age is non-missing. Moreover, as in the women
sample, the women included in this sample were married not before 5 years of age, their
menarcheal age is between 9 and 21 years, and they have valid information on age, height,
caste, family attributes like parental education and number of siblings, and place of residence.
With all these restrictions in place, the sample consists of 21,718 women. We will refer to
this sample as the spousal sample.6
In our analysis, we specically focus on three labor market outcomes of women and their
spouses including hourly earnings,7 annual wage earnings, and work days per year.8 Table
1 provides descriptive statistics on the two analytical samples. The average hourly earnings
of the women included in our analytical sample is Rs. 18.25, average annual wage earnings
is Rs. 24,000, average number of work days per year is 205. The average hourly earnings
of the working men (i.e., spouses of the women) is Rs. 33.12, average annual wage earnings
is Rs. 66,900, average number of work days is 273 per year. The average age of marriage
of women is 17.23 years for the womens sample and 17.93 years for the spousal sample.
The average age at menarche is 13.88 years for the womens sample and 13.85 years for the
spousal sample. Figures 1 and 2 graph the distribution of the age at marriage and age at
menarche respectively for each of the two samples.
6Just to be clear, In the womens sample, we include working women for whom we have valid data on
labor market outcomes irrespective of whether their husbands are working or not. In the spousal sample,
we include working spouses for whom we have valid data on labor market outcomes irrespective of whether
their wives are working or not.
7Hourly earnings include hourly wages, bonus and other in-cash or kind benets.
8In the womens sample, around 46% of the women work as the agricultural labourers, 23% work in
construction, 6% work as teachers and the rest work in other areas. In terms of employment by industry
type, 48% of the women are engaged in agriculture, agriculture-related or mining sector, 9% are engaged
in the manufacturing sector, 22% are engaged in the construction sector and the rest are engaged in other
sectors. In the spousal sample, 21% of the men (i.e., spouses of the women) work as agricultural labourers,
28% work as construction workers, 6% work as drivers and the rest work in other areas. By type of industry,
22% percent of the men are engaged in agriculture, agriculture-related or mining sector, 14% are engaged in
the manufacturing sector, 27% are engaged in the construction sector and remaining are engaged in other
sectors.
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Econometric model
To examine the impact of womens age at marriage on their own labor market outcomes, we
begin by estimating the following econometric model:
yi = + MarriageAgei + Xi + "i (1)
where yi denotes a labor market outcome of woman i, MarriageAgei denotes the womans
age at marriage, Xi denotes the vector of individual and household level controls, and "i is
the idiosyncratic error term that includes unobserved attributes like ability.
To examine the impact of womens age at marriage on her spousal labor market outcomes,
we estimate a model similar to the model given by Equation (1). However, yi now denotes a
labor market outcome of woman is husband. Moreover, Xi includes additional controls for
spousal characteristics. Henceforth, we will refer to Equation (1) as the womens regression,
and the version of the equation (1) which models spousal labor market outcomes, as the
spousal regression.
Our parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient . In the womens regression,  captures
the e¤ect of womens age at marriage on their own labor market outcomes. In the spousal
regression, it captures the e¤ect of womens age at marriage on the labor market outcomes
of their spouses.
As most studies do, we exclude various determinants of labor market outcomes such as
educational attainment from the estimation, as these variables are potentially endogenous
variables that could be inuenced by an individuals decision about her timing of rst mar-
riage (see for e.g. Wang and Wang 2017). That is, these variables themselves could be the
reasons why age at rst marriage a¤ects individualswages and work e¤ort. Given that we
condition on only exogenous variables, the estimated coe¢ cient of  should be interpreted
as the total e¤ect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes.
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Note, for the womens regression as well as the spousal regression, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimate of  > 0 is consistent with the selection hypothesis as well as the causal
mechanisms. We could have consistently estimated  via OLS estimation and interpreted it
as causal e¤ect of age of marriage on labor market outcomes if, conditioning on exogenous
characteristics, age at marriage was uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of labor
market outcomes such as wages and labor supply (or more formally, E[MarriageAge "j
X] = 0). However, such assumption may be violated for several reasons. First, omitted
variables may a¤ect both the age at marriage of the women and their own and their spousal
labor market outcomes. For instance, as noted previously, parents of girls with better labor
market prospects may postpone their daughtersmarriages until their earnings capabilities
are fully revealed. Also, those parents who care a great deal about their daughters career
could postpone their daughtersmarriages in order to let them pursue their careers. Both
examples suggest that E[MarriageAge " jX] 6= 0 and more likely, E[MarriageAge " jX] >
0 in the womens regression. For the spousal regression, it is also likely that E[MarriageAge
" j X] > 0. This may be because men of higher ability may want to marry more educated
women, and hence might prefer marrying older women since they are likely to be more
educated. As a result, OLS estimates would be biased in both the womens regression as
well as the spousal regression.9
The second issue relates to the accuracy of the report of age of marriage. In the IHDS
2012 age at marriage was self reported. Inaccurate reports would generate measurement error
in the explanatory variable. This could attenuate the estimates of the coe¢ cient of interest.
To address these concerns, we follow an instrument variable (IV) approach. We use age of
menarche as an instrument for womens age at marriage. This instrument is motivated by
the observation that has been made by sociologists and anthropologists that parents become
extremely anxious to get their daughter married once she has reached menarche, partly to
avert any unwanted pregnancies (Caldwell et al. 1983; Srinivas 1984; Chari et al. 2017).
9In principal, there might be other potential omitted variables which are not orthogonal to age of marriage
of the women and might be correlated with the labor market outcomes considered.
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As noted by Field and Ambrus (2008), a signicant portion of the variation in timing of
menarche is random, rendering it a good instrument for the age at marriage.10 In what
follows, we discuss our IV strategy in detail.
3.2 Instrumental variable strategy
The IV approach involves estimating a two stage model which is specied as follows:
MarriageAgei = + MenarcheAgei + Xi + i (2)
yi = + MarriageAgei + Xi + "i (3)
The rst stage is given by the equation (2), and equation (3) is the structural equation.
The womens age at marriage, MarriageAgei, is instrumented by MenarcheAgei, their age
at menarche, and yi are the womens and their spouseslabor market outcomes of interest.
As above, Xi denotes a vector of individual and household level controls such as the womans
age, height, family attributes like her fathers and mothers years of schooling, number of
siblings, place of residence (urban/rural), caste and district xed e¤ects. Note, in the spousal
regression, the vector Xi also includes the husbands age as an additional control.
We use a standard two stage estimation procedure (i.e., two stage least squares (TSLS))
and cluster standard errors at the district level.
3.3 Validity of the instrumental variable
In this section, we perform several checks to test the validity of the instrumental variable.
First, we examine whether age at menarche predicts age at marriage which is the endogenous
regressor. In line with the ndings of Field and Ambrus (2008) in context of Bangladesh,
10Studies of twins have found that random genetic variation is the single largest source of variations in
menarche (see for e.g. Kaprio et al., 1995)
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and that of Sekhri and Debnath (2017) and Chari et al. (2017) in context of India, we nd
that age at menarche signicantly predicts age at marriage. The results from the regression
of womens age at marriage are presented in Table 2. Panel A presents the results obtained
using the sample of working women (i.e., the womens sample), and panel B presents the
results obtained using the sample of women with working spouses (i.e., the spousal sample).
Column (1) reports the coe¢ cient of age at menarche without additional controls. The value
of the coe¢ cient is 0.243, and it is statistically signicant at 1% level of signicance, the
F-Statistic for the regression model is 14.87. The corresponding coe¢ cient value of age at
menarche and the F-statistic for the spousal sample are 0.147 and 9.4 respectively. Again
the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant at 1% level of signicance. These results eliminate
concerns about weak instrumentsAdditionally, Figure 3 also presents the kernel density
estimate of womens age at marriage by menarcheal age groups (early and late menarche)11
revealing that the distributions of womens age at marriage is positively related to age at
menarche.
Next, we examine the potential threats to the validity of this instrument. Medical liter-
ature suggests that severe malnutrition in early childhood might result in delayed onset of
menarche (Sekhri and Debnath, 2017). Exposure to severe malnutrition could potentially
also a¤ect long term health of the women (for e.g. Stathopolu et al. (2003) note that acute
malnutrition could result in stunting) and this consequently could a¤ect their labor market
prospects. This could undermine our instrument. We examine this correlation in our sample.
Figure 4 shows average adult heights by age at menarche among the women in our sample.
We do not observe any evidence of signicant correlation between adult height and age at
menarche.
As argued by Field and Ambrus (2008), abrupt changes in diet might also a¤ects matura-
tion. Sekhri and Debnath (2017) in this context note that, agriculture and agriculture-related
activities, that employ majority of the Indians, are highly weather dependent. Extreme
11The early menarche group consists of those women who attained menarche at the age of 14 or earlier.
The late menarche group consists of those women who attained menarche after the age of 14.
12
weather conditions (e.g. droughts, oods, etc.) in the womens birth year might lead to loss
in household income resulting in transitory but severe malnutrition. Therefore, females born
during these extreme weather events may experience delayed age at menarche as they are
more likely to be malnourished. We control for this possibility in our rst stage regression.
In column (2), we add age of the women to account for extreme weather events at the time
of birth. Additionally, in this regression we also include controls for womens caste a¢ liation
in column (2). The point estimates and standard errors are similar across columns (1) and
(2) in both Panels A as well as B.
Next, we include adult height in the regression in column (3) as a proxy for acute mal-
nutrition in childhood. As noted by Chari et al. (2017), if height is a su¢ cient statistic for
health investments and if undernutrition that a¤ects menarche is also is severe enough to
result in stunting, then conditioning on height is likely to eliminate any confounding fac-
tor related to health investments that a¤ect both menarche and marriage conditions. We
nd that inclusion of height as an additional control changes the point estimates and the
standard errors only slightly. Even if height is not a su¢ cient statistic for health, since it
is closely related to health (Strauss and Thomas 1989), the fact that controlling for height
has very small e¤ects on our results suggests that they are not driven by unobserved health
inputs that also a¤ect age at menarche. We condition all subsequent results on adult height,
womens age and caste a¢ liation.
It is thought that strenuous physical labor during early childhood can adversely a¤ect
health of children and lead to a delay in menarche (Pellerin-Massicotte et al. 1997). Thus
women who end up marrying late may also be less healthy, and this could have a direct e¤ect
on her labor market prospects. However, as argued by Sekhri and Debnath, the children
who work in India are not involved in hard physical work such as construction. They note
that detailed data on child labor collected from northern India show that more than 99 % of
working girls of age 6 to 14 are engaged in domestic work while 0.001 % of them work for wage
(Basu et al. 2010). As such, strenuous physical labor during early childhood is unlikely to
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render our instrument endogenous. Nevertheless, to address this concern we include controls
for womens fathers and mothers educational attainment (i.e., years of schooling) as well as
the number of siblings of the women and reestimate the rst stage equation. We argue that
these family characteristics are likely to serve as good proxies for economic status of womens
natal family. Consequently, these family characteristics are likely to be correlated with a
womans age at marriage as well be determinants of whether the woman worked strenuously
as a child or not. As evident from the results reported in Column (4), the inclusion of
the womens natal family characteristics as additional controls does not change the point
estimates of the coe¢ cient of age at menarche signicantly.
Age at menarche might also be potentially endogenous due to geographical factors such
as temperature, rainfall, altitude, etc. (Field and Ambrus 2008; Chari et al. 2017). To
address this issue, we control for place of residence (whether the household resides in an
urban or a rural locality) and use district xed e¤ects to account for spatial variation in
exposure to environmental factors that a¤ect menarche. Note, we are able to control for
district of residence of the married woman, and not her natal district since we do not have
any information about the location of her natal family. This, however, is not likely to be
a problem because in India most marriages occur within the same district, so the district
of residence of the married woman is also likely also her natal district (Fulford 2015). The
results of the specication that include geographic controls is presented in Column (5). The
coe¢ cient of age at menarche is still highly statistically signicant.12
Another concern is measurement error in the age at menarche. While this is possible
since it was self-reported by respondents at the time of the survey, Garg et al. (2001) and
Sharma et al. (2006) note that menarche is a major event for girls in India, and girls of both
low and high caste report knowing little or nothing about menstruation before it began, but
afterwards learning of taboos about eating and mobility during menstrual periods. These
12Note, for all the spousal regressions reported in Panel B, except for that reported in column (1), spousal
age is included as an additional control variable since we use this variable as an exogenous covariate in the
second stage of the spousal regressions.
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changes in lifestyle imply that respondents are likely to recall its timing with fair degree of
accuracy (Chari et al. 2017).13 Furthermore, the distribution of reported age at menarche
(Figure 2) does not show any heaping at key ages (e.g. school leaving ages) that might be
suggestive of signicant recall error.
The nal concern that we need to address is whether our instrument is exogenous condi-
tional on the fact that we are not controlling for education. One might be tempted to argue
that a womans educational attainment as measured by her years of schooling, is correlated
with her age at menarche. More specically, menarche itself might be a barrier to schooling.
If this is the case, then leaving out education from the set of control variables will violate the
condition that E[MenarcheAge "j X] = 0; and the IV regressions will not yield consistent
estimates of the parameters of interest.
To address the issue of endogeneity due to omission of schooling from our model, we do
the following. First, we plot the average years of schooling of women by di¤erent menarcheal
age in Figure 5. We nd no evidence of an upward trend in the relationship between schooling
and age at menarche. Second, we present the kernel density estimate of womens years of
schooling by terciles of menarcheal age in Figure 6. The gure reveals that the population
distributions, and not just averages, are remarkably similar across all subsamples. This is not
what we would have expected to nd if menarcheal age was correlated with years of schooling.
Third, we explore the relationship between years of schooling of women, age at menarche,
and marriage age using a regression framework. Results are reported in Table 3. We nd
that age at menarche has a positive and signicant impact on years of schooling when we do
not control for age at marriage. However, when we control for age at marriage, menarcheal
age no longer signicantly a¤ects educational attainment of women. This suggests that
conditional on age at marriage, menarcheal age does not have an e¤ect on educational
attainment. Thus, all the evidences suggest that not controlling for educational attainment
13Ellis (2004, 921) based on a survey also note, both adolescent girls and adult women are generally
willing and able to report accurately on their ages at menarche...and retrospective reports may be more
reliable than those obtained during puberty.
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of women are unlikely to confound our analysis. Our result, is in fact, consistent with Field
and Ambrus(2008) nding that menarcheal age has no direct impact on womens schooling
in Bangladesh.14
4 Results
4.1 OLS results
The OLS estimates of the e¤ect of womens age at marriage on own and spousal labor market
outcomes are presented in Table 4. While these estimates are not causal, nevertheless they
are likely to serve as useful benchmarks with which we would be able to compare our IV
estimates, in turn, allowing us to distinguish causality from correlation due to selection into
marriage.
Examining the results in Panel A of Table 4, we rst nd that womens age at marriage
is positively associated with all own labor market outcomes that we have considered namely
hourly earnings (column 1), annual wage earnings (column 2), and work days per year
(column 3). More specically, our results indicate that a year of delayed marriage increases
womens hourly earnings by 2%, annual wage earnings by 3%, and work days per year by
roughly 2. These results imply that marital delay is benecial for women in terms of labor
market outcomes.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the associations between womens age at marriage and labor
market outcomes of their spouses. We nd that, a year of delayed marriage for women has a
positive e¤ect on their spouseslabor market performance. Specically, our results indicate
that a year of delayed marriage of women increases their spouseshourly earnings by 1%,
14Note, Sekhri and Debnath (2014) and Chari et al. (2017) also implicitly assume that age of menarche
is not correlated with womens education. Both the papers investigate investigate the impact of marital age
of the mother on child health and education outcomes. Marital age is instrumented by menarcheal age, but
mothers education is not controlled for. Given that mothers education is conjectured to a determinant of
child outcomes, mothers education becomes of the part of the error term in the second stage regression,
which must be assumed to be uncorrelated to menarcheal age, for their second stage parameter estimates to
be consistent.
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annual wage earnings by 2%, and work days per year by 1. These results imply that womens
age at marriage has a positive spillover e¤ect on their spouseslabor market outcomes.
These results appear to be consistent with causal hypotheses such as the formal education
hypothesis and mobility argument in Loughran and Zissimpoulos (2004). These results,
however, could also arise due to the selection hypothesis (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993). To
examine whether the observed relationship between womens age at marriage and their own
and their spouseslabor market is causal, we use the IV approach.
4.2 IV results
We next turn to the IV results in Table 5. As in case of OLS, we present the e¤ects of
womens age at marriage on their own labor market outcomes in Panel A. The e¤ects of
womens age at marriage on their spouseslabor market outcomes are presented in Panel B.
We nd that the magnitude of the IV estimates of the e¤ect of womens age at marriage on
their labor market outcomes are much smaller compared to the OLS estimates. For example,
the e¤ect of a one year delay in womens age at marriage on their hourly earnings is now
only 0.5%. The corresponding OLS gure was 2%. Similarly, the e¤ect of a year delay in
womens annual wage earnings is now 1%, which according to the OLS estimates was 3%.
More importantly, in sharp contrast to our OLS results, we now nd that IV estimates of the
coe¢ cients of womens age at marriage is not statistically signicant in any of the regressions
that are reported in Panel A. These results indicate that a delay in marriage of women by a
year has no signicant causal impact on their own labor market outcomes.
Panel B of Table 5 reveals results that are similar to that of Panel A. Specically, we nd
no evidence that a delay in womens marriage by a year has any causal impact on the labor
market outcomes of their spouses. In terms of the magnitudes of the estimates of the e¤ect
of womens age at marriage on spousal labor market outcomes, the e¤ects are now actually
negative although statistically insignicant.
Overall, thus the IV results indicate that a delay in marriage of women by a year has no
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signicant causal impact on own or spousal labor market outcomes. The OLS results were,
thus, arising due to positive selection into marriage.
4.3 Comparison of OLS and IV based on compliers: selection vs.
causal mechanisms
The comparison of our OLS and IV estimates indicates that our results are consistent with
the selection hypothesis. However, as noted by Wang and Wang (2017), the comparison of
full-sample OLS and IV estimates may not necessarily be a fair evaluation of the hypothesis.
As pointed out in Imbens and Angrist (1994), the IV estimates capture only the e¤ect for
a subgroup of individuals who are likely impacted by the IV (i.e., the compliers). The IV
estimates for the complier sample might actually be higher than the IV estimates for the full
sample.
In the present study, the set of compliers will not consist of women who were married
before they attained maturation. For these women, age at menarche would not have a¤ected
their marital age. Consequently, we assume that our complier subsample excludes women
who were married before menarche.15 16 We re-estimate the OLS and IV models for these
women. The OLS and IV results for the potential compliers are reported in Tables 6 and 7
respectively. We continue to nd that the OLS estimates are larger than the IV estimates.
Moreover, as before, the OLS estimates are statistically signicant whereas the IV estimates
are not. This again indicates that our results are consistent with the selection hypothesis.
15The average age at marriage of these women is 17.91 years for the womens sample and 18.41 years for
the spousal sample.
16It might be that the complier set excludes not only women who were married before maturation but also
those who were married much after maturation (say, those who were married after teenage or after early
adulthood). Consequently, for checking sensitivity of our results, we assume that our complier subsample
excludes women who were married before menarche or were married ten years after menarche. The results
 reported in the Appendix indicate no substantial di¤erence in the our ndings with respect to that
obtained based on the baseline complier sample.
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4.4 Addressing biases due to selection into labor force
To this point, we have considered only labor market outcomes of women and their spouses
who are working in our empirical analysis. We have excluded nonworking women (from the
womens regression) and men (from the spousal regression) since we do not observe wages and
labor supply for these nonworkers. Given that non-working individuals systematically di¤er
from working individuals, our analysis could be biased. This might especially be relevant
for our analysis since women in India have remarkably low rates of employment and labor
force participation.17 In fact, in accordance to Beckers (1973) theory of specialization, if
women drop out of the labor market, ignoring this could potentially lead to underestimation
of the benecial e¤ects of delayed marriage for women. In principle, thus, this might be one
reason why we observe statistically insignicant causal e¤ects of delayed marriage on labor
market outcomes of women for the full sample and the complier sample. In what follows, we
examine whether the observed results and patterns are robust to addressing the selection.
Our approach closely follows that used by Wang and Wang (2017).
4.4.1 Selection models and validity of exclusion restriction
To address the selection issue, consider the extended system of Equations (2) and (3) in the
presence of endogeneity.
MarriageAgei = + MenarcheAgei + Xi + i (4)
yi = + MarriageAgei + Xi + "i (5)
Si = I(Zi   i  0) (6)
17National Sample Survey (NSS) data for India show that labour force participation rates
of women aged 25-54 (including primary and subsidiary status) have stagnated at about 26-
28% in urban areas, and fallen substantially from 57% to 44% in rural areas, between 1987
and 2011 (see https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/vgO1ynMV6UMDnF6kW5Z3VJ/Low-stagnating-female-
labourforce-participation-in-India.html)
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where S is an indicator and equal to one if one participates in the labor market and zero
otherwise; and Z is a vector of exogenous characteristics, which can include a variable not
in the set of X. Equation (6) indicates that a woman or a man decides to participate in
the labor market when Z     0. The model can be identied under typical assumptions
for IV and selection models and estimated via a variant of the conventional Heckman model
(see Wooldridge (2010, p. 809) for details).
As is noted by Wang and Wang (2017) and many others, Heckman type of selection
models do not perform quite well even though identication can be achieved through distri-
butional assumption without an exclusion restriction (i.e., Z = X). To address this concern,
we include an exclusion restriction spousal earnings (Z) to aid identication. Specically,
Z equals one if spousal earnings is greater than median income and zero otherwise. This
choice of exclusion restrictions for the labor supply equation (particularly for that by females)
is a popular one in the literature, and similar variables have been used in the previous lit-
erature (e.g. Buchinsky 2001; Chang 2011; Martins 2001). Below, we present our evidence
supporting this choice.
To assess the validity of our exclusion restriction, we present two sets of results in Ta-
ble 8 based on the full sample as well as the complier sample. The rst set is concerned
with the strength of empirical relationship between our exclusion restriction and labor force
participation decision of the women and their spouses. The literature has generally found
strong evidence that spousal income inuences a womans decision to participate in the labor
market (e.g. Mroz 1987; Zabel 1993). We present the marginal e¤ects of spousal income
on a womans probabilities of labor force participation. Consistent with the literature, our
rst-stage results show that spousal income indeed has a negative and statistically signicant
e¤ect on labor force participation rates among women. Specically, having a spouse who
earns more than median income can reduce female labor force participation rate by roughly
12% (Panel A, Column 1 of Table 8). Similar results are also obtained for the spouses of
women. Specically, having a spouse who earns more than median income can reduce male
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labor force participation rate by roughly 3% (Panel B, Column 1 of Table 8).
The second set of results is concerned with the independence of an exclusion restriction;
the exclusion restriction must be independent of potential labor market outcomes (or con-
ditional on X). Such assumption may be violated if spousal earnings has any direct e¤ects
on individual wages or labor supply, or is indirectly related with individuals wages or labor
supply through other channels. As noted by Wang and Wang (2017), one possibility is selec-
tion into marriage based on unobservable determinants of individual labor market outcomes,
which implies potential non-zero correlation between spousal income and the error term as
well. To formally test whether this assumption (along with the monotonicity assumption) is
violated, we conduct a formal test based on a novel method proposed in Huber and Mellace
(2014). They show that under our model assumptions, the following inequalities hold:
E[yjz = 1; S = 1; yi  yq]  E[yjz = 0; S = 1]
 E[yjz = 1; S = 1; yi  y1 q]
where yq the qth conditional quantile in the conditional outcome distribution given Z = 1
and S = 1. Such inequalities imply the following null hypothesis:
E[yjz = 1; S = 1; yi  yq]  E[yjz = 0; S = 1]  0
E[yjz = 0; S = 1]  E[yjz = 1; S = 1; yi  y1 q]  0
Huber andMellace (2014) propose a test procedure to verify these inequalities. A negative
test statistic with a large p value indicates that the IV is valid. The results for the full sample
are presented in column (2) of panels A and B of Table 8. We fail to reject the validity of
our exclusion restriction, strongly in favor of the use of the presence of spousal income as an
exclusion restriction for the selection equation.
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Columns (3) and (4) in Panels A and B of Table 8 replicate regressions reported in
columns (1) and (2) respectively for the complier sample. As evident, these results are in
line with the results for the full sample. These results, while not necessarily denitive, do
increase our condence in the identication assumption used in our analysis.
4.4.2 Results addressing selection
We now turn to actual estimates addressing the selection issue. We repeat all of our analysis
addressing the selection issue. The results for the full sample and complier sample are
presented in Table 9. As we can see, all of our baseline results continue to hold. Not only
do we nd similar patterns in our estimates; we generally nd estimates to be remarkably
similar in magnitudes as well. Specically, we again nd a statistically insignicant e¤ect
of womens delayed marriage on hourly earnings, annual wage earnings, and work days per
year among women and their spouses for the full sample and the complier sample. Since the
IV estimates continue to be statistically insignicant even after correcting for selection bias,
we conclude that there does not exist a causal relationship between womens age at marriage
and their own and their spousal labor market outcomes.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the relationship between womens age at marriage and their own
and their spouses labor market outcomes using nationally representative household data
from India. We nd evidence of positive e¤ects of age at marriage of women on their own
as well their spouseslabor market outcomes. To examine whether these e¤ects are causal
(i.e., the e¤ect arises due to more schooling as a result of marriage delay for example) or
the e¤ects arise due to selection into marriage, we use an IV based empirical strategy that
utilizes variation in age at menarche to obtain exogenous variation in the age at marriage.
Our results indicate that the positive e¤ects of age at marriage of women on their own as
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well their spouseslabor market outcomes arise due to selection into marriage. Our ndings
are robust to (1) dropping women from our sample who are not likely to be a¤ected by
our instrument, and (2) addressing biases due to nonrandom selection into labor force. Our
ndings might appear to be somewhat puzzling since it has been documented in the previous
literature that a delay in womens marriage leads to more schooling in developing countries
(see for e.g. Field and Ambrus 2008). In fact, for our analytical sample as well, we show that
there exists a positive link between marriage delay and womens schooling (see Table A2 in
the Appendix). As such, at least due to the formal schooling hypothesis, one would have
expected to nd a causal e¤ect of a womens age at marriage on labor market outcomes.
We argue that one potential explanation for this apparently puzzling nding could be
as follows. It has been noted by Kingdon (1998), Kingdon and Unni (2001), and Kanjilal-
Bhaduri and Pastore (2017) among many others that in India, labor market returns to
education is low and insignicant for women with relatively low education. This could be
due to: (1) low quality of primary education in India (Pratham 2011),18 and/or (2) for labor
market success, a threshold level of education might be necessary (for instance, completing
college or having a vocational degree); below that, an extra year of schooling might not
lead to better labor market outcomes. As it turns out, 72% women in our sample have
completed at most primary education (i.e., ve years of formal schooling) and more than
90% have completed only secondary schooling (i.e., 10 years of formal schooling). Thus,
although women in our sample might complete more formal schooling due to a delay in
marriage by a year, this might not be su¢ ciently productive to get translated into better
labor market outcomes since most women in our sample would still belong to the lower end
of the education distribution.
Our ndings thus suggest that complementing policies that seek to delay marriages of
women in developing countries with educational policies that would augment the quality of
primary schooling is likely to be useful. If this could be achieved, even a delay in marriage
18Pratham (2011) notes that 48% of Indian children in grade 5 could not read at grade 2 level, and nearly
58% could not solve a simple division problem.
23
by a year that might allow a woman to attain only one more year of primary schooling might
be useful for her in the labor market. Additionally, policymakers perhaps might also think
of designing policies that would incentivize parents to delay their daughtersmarriages by
such an extent that they are able to complete higher education (for e.g. complete college
or nish 15 years of formal schooling), since our suggest that a marriage-delay policy that
would cause women to complete an extra year of education is unlikely to be meaningful in
terms of getting translated into better labor market prospects for women who only complete
primary or secondary schooling.
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Figure 1. Distribution of women’s age at marriage for the two samples 
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Figure 2. Distribution of age at menarche for the two samples 
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Figure 3. Distribution of women’s age at marriage by age at menarche group for 
the two samples 
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Figure 4. Relationship between women’s average height and age at menarche for 
the two samples 
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Figure 5. Relationship between women’s average years of schooling and age at 
menarche group for the two samples 
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Figure 6. Kernel density estimates of women’s years of schooling by terciles of age 
at menarche 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Women’s Sample Spousal Sample 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Women’s Labor Market Outcomes     
Hourly earnings (in Rs.) 18.25 24.40     
Annual wage earnings (in Rs.) 23977.56 50282.33     
Work days per year 205.29 103.85     
Spousal Labor Market Outcomes     
Hourly earnings (in Rs.)     33.12 41.16 
Annual wage earnings (in Rs.)     66885.67 88398.96 
Work days per year     273.22 82.13 
Women's characteristics     
Age at marriage 17.23 3.76 17.93 3.62 
Age at Menarche 13.88 1.40 13.85 1.39 
Age 37.64 8.90 35.14 9.32 
Spousal age 42.06 9.72 40.25 10.10 
Height (in cm) 151.32 6.55 151.73 6.56 
Father's years of schooling 2.09 3.76 3.11 4.34 
Mother's years of schooling 0.85 2.42 1.36 2.94 
Number of Siblings 3.77 1.97 3.81 1.98 
Place of Residence (=1 if Urban) 0.21 0.41 0.34 0.47 
N 10,511 21,718 
Notes: In subsequent regressions, women (spousal) sample is used for examining the impact of 
women’s age at marriage on women’s (spousal) labor market outcomes. Women (Spousal) sample 
consists of working as well as non-working spouses (women). As such we do not report the mean 
and standard deviations of labor market outcomes of spouses (women) in the women (spousal) 
sample. In the women sample, spousal age is available for 9,262 observations, and hence the mean 
and standard deviation of spousal age is computed based on these observations. We, however, do 
not use this variable in subsequent regressions based on the women sample.  
 
 Table 2. OLS estimates of the effect of age at menarche on women’s age at 
marriage 
Panel A: Women’s Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Age at Menarche 0.243*** 0.233*** 0.220*** 0.215*** 0.446*** 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.052) (0.039) 
      
F-statistic 14.87 32.06 30.69 84.00 130.00 
R2 0.008 0.053 0.059 0.149 0.361 
Observations 10,511 10,511 10,511 10,511 10,511 
Panel B: Spousal Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Age at Menarche 0.147*** 0.164*** 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.366*** 
 (0.048) (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.024) 
      
F-statistic 9.40 33.03 33.62 96.35 225.03 
R2 0.003 0.043 0.050 0.144 0.335 
Observations 21,718 21,718 21,718 21,718 21,718 
Notes: Estimation via OLS. The outcome variable is women’s age at marriage. 
Regressions reported in columns (1) of Panels A and B, do not include any 
controls. In column (2) regressions we include women’s age and caste affiliation 
as controls.  In column (3) regressions the control variables are women’s age, 
caste affiliation, and height. In column (4), controls include women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, and 
number of siblings. In column (5), we include district fixed effects in addition to 
all controls used. For regressions reported in columns (2) through (5) in Panel 
B, we also include spousal age as an additional control. Standard errors reported 
in the parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p 
< 0.1.    
 Table 3. OLS estimates of the effect of age at menarche and 
women’s age at marriage on women’s years of schooling 
Panel A: Women's sample 
 [1] [2] 
Age at Menarche 0.104*** -0.012 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Age at Marriage  0.260*** 
  (0.016) 
   
R2 0.539 0.567 
Observations 10,511 10,511 
Panel B: Spousal sample     
 [1] [2] 
Age at Menarche 0.116*** 0.011 
 (0.023) (0.022) 
Age at Marriage  0.286*** 
  (0.012) 
   
R2 0.535 0.566 
Observations 21,718 21,718 
Notes: Estimation via OLS. The outcome variable is women’s 
years of schooling. The regressions reported in Panel A control 
for women’s age, caste affiliation, height, father’s years of 
schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and 
district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include 
control for spousal age in addition to all the controls used in the 
regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the 
parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p 
<0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 Table 4. OLS estimates of the effect of women’s age at marriage on own and spousal labor 
market outcomes 
Panel A: Women’s Regression 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.017*** 0.033*** 1.655*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.352) 
    
R2 0.350 0.436 0.278 
Observations 10,511 10,511 10,511 
Panel B: Spousal Regression 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.873*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.181) 
    
R2 0.372 0.449 0.240 
Observations 21,718 21,718 21,718 
Notes: Estimation via OLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and 
district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition 
to all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the 
parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 Table 5. IV estimates of the effect of women’s age at marriage on own and spousal labor market 
outcomes 
Panel A: Women’s Regression 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.005 0.015 -0.288 
 (0.010) (0.020) (1.677) 
    
R2 0.347 0.434 0.275 
First Stage F-statistic 130.00 130.00 130.00 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 65.07 65.07 65.07 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 10,511 10,511 10,511 
Panel B: Spousal Regression 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage -0.005 -0.007 -0.262 
 (0.011) (0.019) (1.481) 
    
R2 0.368 0.445 0.239 
First Stage F-statistic 225.03 225.03 225.03 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 109.13 109.13 109.13 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 21,718 21,718 21,718 
Notes: Estimation via TSLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and 
district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to 
all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the parentheses 
are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 Table 6. OLS estimates of the effect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes, 
Complier Subsample 
Panel A: Women’s Regression     
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.023*** 0.040*** 2.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.415) 
    
R2 0.364 0.438 0.283 
Observations 9,362 9,362 9,362 
Panel B: Spousal Regression     
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.938*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.199) 
    
R2 0.370 0.446 0.248 
Observations 20,102 20,102 20,102 
Notes: Estimation via OLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, 
caste affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number 
of siblings, and district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control 
for spousal age in addition to all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. 
Standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, 
**p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 Table 7. IV estimates of the effect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes, Complier 
subsample 
Panel A: Women's Regression       
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.005 0.021 0.072 
 (0.009) (0.017) (1.429) 
    
R2 0.358 0.436 0.281 
First stage F statistic 267.65 267.65 267.65 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 91.42 91.42 91.42 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 9,362 9,362 9,362 
Panel B: Spousal Regression       
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage -0.001 -0.004 -0.07 
 (0.010) (0.016) (1.281) 
    
R2 0.368 0.443 0.247 
First stage F statistic 372.73 372.73 372.73 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 136.15 136.15 136.15 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 20,102 20,102 20,102 
Notes:  Estimation via TSLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and 
district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to 
all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the parentheses 
are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 Table 8. Validity tests of instruments in selection models 
Panel A: Women's Regression       
 Full Sample  Compliers 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
 Marginal effects Validity test  Marginal effects Validity test 
Husband's income -0.122*** -3.547  -0.118*** -3.587 
 (0.010) [p=1.000]  (0.010) [p=1.000] 
Panel B: Spousal Regression 
 [1] [2]  [1] [2] 
 Marginal effects Validity test  Marginal effects Validity test 
Wife's income -0.030*** -3.248  -0.033*** -3.257 
  (0.003) [p=1.000]   (0.003) [p=1.000] 
Notes: The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste affiliation, height, father’s years of 
schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and district fixed effects.  The regressions reported 
in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel 
A. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 
0.1. The validity test of the IV is developed in Huber and Mellace (2011). The null hypothesis is that the IV is 
valid.    
Table 9. Selection-bias corrected IV estimates of the effect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes 
Panel A: Women's Regression 
 Full Sample  Compliers 
 [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6] 
 
Hourly 
Earnings 
Annual Wage 
Earnings 
Work Days Per 
Year  
Hourly 
Earnings 
Annual Wage 
Earnings 
Work Days Per 
Year 
Age at Marriage 0.005 0.014 -0.357  0.005 0.021 0.096 
 (0.010) (0.020) (1.669)  (0.009) (0.017) (1.419) 
        
R2 0.351 0.441 0.282  0.362 0.444 0.289 
First Stage F-statistic 130.05 130.05 130.05  268.41 268.41 268.41 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 65.07 65.07 65.07  91.41 91.41 91.41 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 10,511 10,511 10,511  9,362 9,362 9,362 
Panel B: Spousal Regression 
 Full Sample  Compliers 
 [1] [2] [3]  [1] [2] [3] 
 
Hourly 
Earnings 
Annual Wage 
Earnings 
Work Days Per 
Year  
Hourly 
Earnings 
Annual Wage 
Earnings 
Work Days Per 
Year 
Age at Marriage -0.005 -0.006 -2.199  -0.001 -0.005 -2.247 
 (0.011) (0.019) (1.723)  (0.010) (0.016) (1.490) 
        
R2 0.375 0.454 0.212  0.374 0.452 0.210 
First Stage F-statistic 227.69 227.69 227.69  372.57 372.57 372.57 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 109.38 109.38 109.38  135.87 135.87 135.87 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 21,718 21,718 21,718   20,102 20,102 20,102 
Notes: Estimation via TSLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of 
schooling, number of siblings, and district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to all the controls used in the 
regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 
Appendix 
Table A1. OLS estimates of the effect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes, Alternative 
Complier Subsample 
Panel A: Women's Regression     
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.016*** 0.028*** 1.676*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.466) 
    
R2 0.329 0.420 0.276 
Observations 8,861 8,861 8,861 
Panel B: Spousal Regression       
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.013*** 0.021*** 1.267*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.236) 
    
R2 0.355 0.434 0.242 
Observations 18,910 18,910 18,910 
Notes: Estimation via OLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and 
district fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition 
to all the controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the 
parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 
Table A2. IV estimates of the effect of age at marriage on labor market outcomes, Alternative 
complier subsample 
Panel A: Women's Regression       
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.005 0.021 0.157 
 (0.008) (0.016) (1.395) 
    
R2 0.327 0.419 0.275 
First stage F statistic 417.13 417.13 417.13 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 102.11 102.11 102.11 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 8,861 8,861 8,861 
Panel B: Spousal Regression       
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Hourly Earnings Annual Wage Earnings Work Days Per Year 
Age at Marriage 0.002 0.001 0.206 
 (0.008) (0.014) (1.140) 
    
R2 0.354 0.432 0.242 
First stage F statistic 747.88 747.88 747.88 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 155.86 155.86 155.86 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 18,910 18,910 18,910 
Notes: Estimation via TSLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for women’s age, caste 
affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, number of siblings, and district 
fixed effects.  The regressions reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to all the 
controls used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are 
clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Table A3. IV estimates of the effect of age at marriage on women’s years of 
schooling 
Panel A: Women's Regression 
 Full Sample Complier Subsample 
 [1] [2] 
Age at Marriage 0.233*** 0.242*** 
 (.058) (.051) 
   
R2 0.567 0.569 
First Stage F-statistic 130.00 267.65 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 65.07 91.42 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 10,511 9,362 
Panel B: Spousal Regression 
 Full Sample Complier Subsample 
 [1] [2] 
Age at Marriage 0.316*** 0.329*** 
 (.058) (.051) 
   
R2 0.565 0.556 
First Stage F-statistic 230.33 383.46 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Kleibergen Paap rK LM statistic 110.57 137.69 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
Observations 21,718 20,102 
Notes: Estimation via TSLS. The regressions reported in Panel A control for 
women’s age, caste affiliation, height, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years 
of schooling, number of siblings, and district fixed effects.  The regressions 
reported in Panel B include control for spousal age in addition to all the controls 
used in the regressions reported in Panel A. Standard errors reported in the 
parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p <0.05, *p < 0.1.    
 
